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The plural economy and its legacy in Asia
The concept of the plural society was introduced into the development lit-
erature by J.S. Furnivall, a member of the Indian civil service who worked 
in Burma for a number of years and then carried out research into the Dutch 
colonial system in the Netherlands Indies in the 1930s. In his influential com-
parative study of Burma and the Netherlands Indies, he argued that by the 
early decades of the twentieth century European colonialism had created a 
very different type of society from that which existed in Europe at that time, 
or had existed in precolonial Southeast Asia. He argued the following:
[T]he western superstructure is only one aspect of a distinctive character, 
common to all tropical dependencies, that cannot fail to impress even the 
most casual observer; the many coloured pattern of the population. In 
Burma, as in Java, probably the fi rst thing that strikes the visitor is the 
medley of peoples – European, Chinese, Indian and native. It is in the 
strictest sense a medley, for they mix but do not combine. Each group holds 
by its own religion, its own culture and language, its own ideas and ways. 
As individuals they meet, but only in the market place, in buying and 
selling. There is a plural society, with different sections of the community 
living side by side, but separately, within the same political unit. Even in 
the economic sphere there is a division of labour along racial lines. Natives, 
Chinese, Indians and Europeans all have different functions, and within 
each major group subsections have particular occupations. (Furnivall 
1948:304-5.)
In an earlier essay, Furnivall pointed out that the plural society came into 
being because the only factor common to all the ethnic groups in colonial 
Southeast Asia was an economic one. This in turn was the result of the over-
whelming importance accorded to economic interests in the territories the 
European colonial powers controlled (Furnivall 1945:171). In this sense the 
plural society and the plural economy were one and the same thing. Furnivall 
probably viewed the plural society and economy as essentially the result of 
colonial economic policies, although he admitted that traces of a plural society 
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were evident in several societies outside the tropical world including Canada, 
the USA, and South Africa. He also argued that in these countries, and in 
Australia and New Zealand, ‘when the influx of alien elements threatened 
national life’, restrictions were placed on in-migration. By the second decade 
of the twentieth century, some colonial regimes in Southeast Asia, including 
the Dutch in the Netherlands Indies and the Americans in the Philippines, 
were also seeking to control in-migration from China in particular, although 
British policy in both Malaya and Burma was more laissez-faire, with respect 
to both Chinese and Indians. But by then main features of the plural society 
were already entrenched. 
The precolonial economy of Southeast Asia
Furnivall tended to contrast the plural society that had emerged in colonial 
Southeast Asia with a precolonial economic and social system where most 
people lived in rural villages, and social and religious factors were far more 
important in people’s lives than economic ones. In his view, culture and 
community dominated in precolonial society, whereas impersonal market 
systems imposed from outside featured much more prominently in colonial 
society (Furnivall 1945; Rex 1959:116). But in recent years, historians have 
begun to view the precolonial economies of Southeast Asia in a rather differ-
ent light.
 Anthony Reid (1993) has called the years from 1450 to 1680 the ‘age of 
commerce’ in Southeast Asia, a period characterized not just by increased 
international trading links but also the growth of cities throughout both main-
land and insular Southeast Asia, and a considerable expansion of domestic 
entrepreneurial and trading activity. The urban areas of Southeast Asia at 
this time were not just trading centres but also the conduits through which 
both religious and secular ideas from many countries filtered into domestic 
societies. Populations were mixed, with indigenous people associating freely 
with traders from the Middle East, South Asia, and China. Several of these 
cities including Aceh, Banten, and Brunei contained at least one fifth of the 
total population under the control of the states where they were located. In 
Southeast Asia as a whole at least five percent of the population was living in 
large urban trading centres. This was a larger proportion than in contempo-
rary northern Europe, although probably not larger than in Mughal India or 
China at that time (Reid 1993:75).
 In spite of the relatively high level of urban development in Southeast 
Asia in the seventeenth century, there were several areas where the region 
was still well behind other parts of Asia, as well as Europe. Banking in its 
modern form, as distinct from traditional money lending, was unknown; in 
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addition the impersonal institutions to safeguard capital and property that 
were developing in Europe were ‘totally absent in Southeast Asia’ (Reid 
1993:129). Reid argues that the close links between rulers and the marketplace 
that characterized much of precolonial Southeast Asia made the evolution of 
individual property rights difficult throughout the region, in contrast to late 
medieval Europe, and to Tokugawa Japan. On the one hand, many members 
of the political elite were involved in trade and commerce, which made them 
more sympathetic to such activities than their counterparts in other parts of 
Asia or indeed in parts of Europe might have been (Reid 1993:270). But, on 
the other hand, a robust independent class of indigenous traders and entre-
preneurs, protected by an impartial legal system, was unable to emerge.
 The reasons for the collapse of the powerful Asian trading port cities 
were complex, and varied by time and place. In the Indonesian archipelago, 
the Dutch would not have been able to destroy centres such as Banten 
and Makassar if there had been more trust, and greater willingness, to 
form durable alliances between the various indigenous kingdoms. Aceh and 
several trading cities in mainland Southeast Asia did not fall under Dutch 
control, but they disengaged from the regional and global trading system 
because they no longer found such activities profitable, or because their 
rulers wanted their populations to concentrate on foodcrop cultivation (Reid 
1993:299-301). Other factors such as climate change may also have contrib-
uted towards the demise of the age of commerce in the region by the end 
of the seventeenth century. What does seem clear is that by 1700 the main 
Asian-ruled trading cities had ‘lost their place both in world trade and within 
their societies’ (Reid 1993:328). Not only did regional and global trading links 
become attenuated, but the outward-looking, cosmopolitan, urban centres 
underwent a steady decline. 
The emergence of the plural economy
The eighteenth century saw the growth of several port cities such as Batavia 
(now Jakarta) and Manila that were under the control of European powers, 
and from which the tentacles of foreign domination stretched out to the hin-
terlands. But the total urban population in Southeast Asia almost certainly 
declined, and there can be little doubt that this century saw a retreat from 
the market into a subsistence agricultural economy in many parts of the 
region. In addition it also witnessed the beginnings of an economic system 
where ethnicity and economic role were more tightly linked. In most parts of 
Southeast Asia, the emergence of the plural economy was inextricably con-
nected to the growth of resident Chinese, and to a lesser extent Indian and 
Arab, populations. During the ‘age of commerce’, the Chinese were just one 
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of several trading minorities active in the larger port cities, and they mixed 
with both indigenous and other trading groups without appearing to domi-
nate. But by the eighteenth century their numbers had grown, mainly because 
economic and demographic pressures in China itself were pushing more 
Chinese into trading and commercial ventures in Southeast Asia, as well as 
into less skilled occupations such as agricultural labour (Reid 2001:50).
 The European-controlled port cities held many attractions for Chinese 
traders in the eighteenth century. They were important sources of valuable 
commodities and precious metals, especially silver, which were much in 
demand in China, and they provided a ‘stable environment in which Chinese 
could grow wealthy and even influential without ceasing to be Chinese’ (Reid 
1993:317). But probably the single most important development that led to 
the sharp functional separation of economic activity by an ethnic group was 
the introduction of tax farming, which was initiated by the Dutch in Batavia 
in the seventeenth century, and which spread to various native states in Java, 
Siam (Thailand), and Cambodia over the next century (Reid 1993:318-9). Tax 
farming, or the system whereby the right to collect revenues on behalf of the 
government is sold or auctioned off to private individuals, is as old as antiquity 
and was widely found in the early-modern period in both Europe and Asia 
(Copeland and Godley 1993). In Southeast Asia it was quite widely practiced 
in the eighteenth century and grew rapidly after 1820 (Butcher 1993:20-1). The 
system permitted rulers to withdraw from commercial concerns while at the 
same time giving private merchants, often Chinese, considerable economic 
power and social prestige without threatening the position of the rulers. Reid 
suggests that it was perhaps no accident that those ethnic groups in Southeast 
Asia where the entrepreneurial spirit best survived into the twentieth century 
were located in remote regions where Chinese tax farming did not penetrate 
or where religious and cultural hostility to tax farming made local rulers 
reluctant to adopt it.
 The nineteenth century saw further growth of European-controlled port 
cities, and by the 1890s there were a number of port cities in mainland 
and island Southeast Asia with populations in excess of 50,000, includ-
ing Rangoon and Moulmein, Bangkok, Singapore, Batavia, Semarang, 
Surabaya, Palembang, Saigon-Cholon, and Manila. In addition, some inland 
cities, several of which had been important in the precolonial era, including 
Mandalay, Yogyakarta, Surakarta, and Hanoi had become important centres 
of colonial administration and trade by the turn of the twentieth century. 
But the nineteenth century was a period of quite rapid population growth in 
much of Southeast Asia and several scholars have pointed out that it is prob-
able that urban populations actually declined relative to total populations in 
many parts of the region (Reid 2001:55).
 Certainly the European colonial powers were not in favour of rapid migra-
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tion of indigenous populations to urban areas, and neither was the govern-
ing elite in Siam, where it has been claimed that the ‘court helped to develop 
urban Siam as a Chinese preserve’ (Phongpaichit and Baker 1995:174). But 
it would be false to claim that urban populations were always overwhelm-
ingly European and Chinese or Indian. In Javanese cities, indigenous 
Indonesians were in the majority by 1890, and this continued to be the case 
until the end of colonial rule (Boomgaard and Gooszen 1991:220-1). But 
in Bangkok it has been estimated that by the 1850s Chinese outnumbered 
indigenous Thai by two to one, and Chinese immigration accelerated from 
the 1860s onwards as the demand for urban labour increased. The govern-
ment was also an important source of employment for Chinese workers, 
especially on railway construction, while the port of Bangkok became ‘vir-
tually a Chinese preserve’ (Phongpaichit and Baker 1995:174-5). In Rangoon 
where Indian immigration had accelerated since the late nineteenth century, 
the 1931 census found that Indians comprised 53 percent of the population. 
They were almost eleven percent of the population in Lower Burma as a 
whole. Only 32 percent of the population of Rangoon consisted of indig-
enous Burmans (Baxter 1941:9-21). 
 After 1900, the division between the newly arrived Chinese and the 
established families became more pronounced, not only in areas that had 
absorbed Chinese migrants for centuries, such as Java, but in other parts 
of Southeast Asia as well. Many children from the latter group began to 
assimilate; they ceased speaking Chinese dialects, learnt local vernaculars 
as well as Dutch, English, or French, and in many cases gravitated towards 
salaried jobs. As educational opportunities increased for Chinese, especially 
in the Netherlands Indies and British Malaya, they were, as Rush (1991:24) 
and Mackie (1991:89) have pointed out, attracted to the ‘genteel professions’ 
rather than the hurly-burly of commerce, although many who lacked the 
ability or the opportunity to learn the languages of the colonial powers stayed 
in unskilled labouring occupations. In addition, there were many new arriv-
als from China, mainly single men, who became coolie labourers, itinerant 
pedlars, and artisans. By the 1930s the Chinese in the Netherlands Indies, the 
Straits Settlements, the Federated Malay States (FMS), and Siam were spread 
across a variety of occupations; in all these territories the majority were in 
nonagricultural occupations, although over 40 percent were in agriculture 
in the islands outside Java and in the FMS, mainly as plantation labourers 
(Table 1). 
 The relative lack of interest in commercial careers on the part of the peranakan 
(assimilated) Chinese in late-colonial Netherlands Indies led Williams (1952:34) 
to argue that ‘the Chinese in Indonesia did not achieve entrepreneurship’. His 
thorough survey of the evidence from the interwar years led him to the conclu-
sion that the Indonesian Chinese were unable, or at least unwilling, to extend 
Anne Booth - 9789004260443
Downloaded from Brill.com06/23/2020 09:19:22AM
via free access
Beyond empire and nation74
their commercial and industrial enterprises beyond the ‘limits imposed largely 
by tradition’ (Williams 1952:55). Certainly there were exceptions, the most 
famous of whom was the ‘sugar king’ Oei Tiong Ham, who built up a large con-
glomerate based mainly on plantations in the early part of the twentieth century 
(Yoshihara 1989). In an official handbook listing all firms operating in the colony 
in 1940, the Oei Tiong Ham concern, including both sugar and banking inter-
ests, was by far the largest Chinese company, and the only Indonesian Chinese 
business, apart from the Overseas Chinese Banking Corporation, with assets in 
excess of 40 million guilders (Twang 1998:Table 2.3). 
 Based on official data and interviews, Twang (1998:Table 2.3) assembled 
a list of the large Chinese firms operating in Java and Sumatra in 1940. Most 
were either in agribusiness, or in trade and banking. Few were in manufac-
turing, apart from agricultural processing. Several large Chinese compa-
nies were still exploiting the so-called privately-owned lands (particuliere 
landerijen), mainly in West Java, which had been in Chinese hands for many 
decades, in spite of Dutch attempts to expropriate the Chinese owners in 
the early twentieth century (Twang 1998:33). There were many medium 
and small-scale enterprises, some in manufacturing, and by no means all 
Table 1. Percentage distribution of the Chinese in the labour force by sector, 
1930s
Sector Java
1930
Outer
Islands
1930
Straits
S’ments
1931
FMS
1931
Thailand
1937
Philippines
1939
Agriculture 9.1 44.7 17.2 41.5 25.4 1.8
Manufacture 20.8 19.5 17.6 27.3 20.3 14.3
Transport 2.8 2.6 12.5 3.4 3.9 1.3
Commerce 57.7 23.2 23.3 12.2 34.9 53.7
Public Service 0.5 0.7 0.2 0.1 1.2 0.2
Professionsa 2.1 1.2 2.3 1.2 1.2 3.6
Personal, etc. 6.9 8.2 26.8 14.4 14.2 25.1
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
a Includes clerical workers
Sources: Indonesia: Department of Economic Affairs 1936, VIII:Table 18; Thailand: 
Central Service of Statistics c.1946:75; Straits Settlements and FMS: Vlieland 
1932:Tables 126, 134; Philippines: Commonwealth of the Philippines 1941:505-21.
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were Chinese-owned. In the 1920s, a government survey conducted in the 
Netherlands Indies showed that there were almost 1,700 Chinese-owned 
industrial firms employing more than five people, compared with 2,800 
European firms and 870 owned by indigenous Indonesians (Fernando and 
Bulbeck 1992:254-9). But all these numbers pale into insignificance when 
compared with developments in other parts of Asia (especially Japan) at the 
same time. Prominent though the Chinese might have appeared in the com-
mercial life of the Netherlands Indies, and in other Southeast Asian cities in 
the 1920s and 1930s, they were hardly laying the foundations for an industrial 
take-off. 
The ‘problem’ of native entrepreneurship
Like many other colonial administrators in different parts of Asia, Furnivall 
(1948:293) recognized that the ‘development of native enterprise must be 
a chief object of policy in any dependency which is valued as a market for 
the products of the colonial power’. He argued that subsistence producers 
should be brought into the market economy, if necessary by imposing taxes 
that had to be paid in money, and was in favour of inducements to encour-
age indigenous cultivators to grow export crops, and of expanded credit to 
native producers, even where this meant borrowing on the security of crops. 
Again like other colonial administrators, Furnivall’s views were at least 
partly motivated by a desire to create larger and more dynamic markets for 
metropolitan manufactures in the colonies. But at the same time he was well 
aware of the debates in various colonial regimes in Southeast Asia concerning 
the desirability of exposing indigenous producers to the full blasts of global 
capitalism. The great majority of colonial officials would have been unaware 
of the precolonial economic history of the regions they were controlling, and 
even if they had realized that there had been an ‘age of commerce’ in the six-
teenth and seventeenth centuries, they would no doubt have argued that the 
world economy in the early twentieth century was very different from that 
four centuries earlier, and while the rewards of involvement in international 
commerce were great, so were the dangers.
 The Dutch in particular debated endlessly the extent to which indigenous 
Indonesians were being incorporated into the ‘Western sphere’ of economic 
influence, the factors which promoted or inhibited such incorporation, and its 
effects on the economic and social welfare of the population. The views of J.H. 
Boeke (1953) on these issues were well-known in the English-speaking world, 
and some scholars have tended to treat them as the ‘official’ Dutch view of 
the entrepreneurial capacities of indigenous Indonesians. As such, they were 
much criticized in the postindependence period by writers such as Higgins 
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(1956) and Sadli (1971). But Boeke’s views underwent considerable change 
in the course of his long career and certainly cannot be considered typical 
of the Dutch colonial establishment as a whole. Some of his earlier writings 
certainly shared similarities with the concept of the plural society, especially 
as they made a sharp distinction between the economic and social needs of 
indigenous Asian populations (Indonesian economics 1961:11). But other Dutch 
officials held different views: for example, Dutch agronomists working inten-
sively in the agricultural sector of Java and other parts of the country, whose 
conclusions were grounded in detailed fieldwork, often viewed the problems 
facing Indonesian farmers as similar to those in other parts of Asia, and in 
precapitalist Europe (Indonesian economics 1961:15-7). 
 In his study of the formation of occidental stereotypes of the ‘Malay char-
acter’, Alatas (1977:112) pointed out that ‘the general negative image was 
not the result of scholarship’. Most of those who proclaimed the indigenous 
peoples of Southeast Asia to be indolent, dull, treacherous, childish, and 
lacking any talent for, or interest in trade and commerce, were either colonial 
officials, planters, military people or casual tourists. And yet, as Alatas con-
cedes, even in the high noon of Western imperialism there were some who 
were prepared to admit that these alleged features of the ‘Malay national 
character’ were by no means universal, and, where they were widely found, 
had quite rational economic foundations. By the early twentieth century, 
most colonial scholars and policymakers in the Netherlands Indies, and in 
other parts of the region as well, would doubtless have concurred with Van 
Gelderen (1961:144), that ‘the inhabitant of the tropics is further removed 
from the classical homo economicus than the Westerner’, but at the same time 
the reasons for the apparent lack of ‘rational economic behaviour’ on the part 
of the indigenous population in the Netherlands Indies were much disputed. 
 Some colonial officials were certainly content to ascribe this perceived lack 
to culture, religion, and the climate, but others thought differently. In 1941, 
Van der Kolff, who held the chair of economics in the Batavia Law School, 
published a remarkable paper that argued that to the extent that Indonesians, 
especially Javanese, adopted short-time horizons and were unwilling to 
invest in risky operations that would yield results only in the longer term, 
they were ignorant, poor, and insecure, rather than irrational. It was, accord-
ing to Van der Kolff (1961:247), poverty and insecurity that led to practices 
such as ijon (Javanese, selling the crop while still immature), and such behav-
iour was perfectly rational given the constraints within which many Javanese 
had to make decisions on consumption, saving, and investment. Other 
writers also stressed the economic rationality of farmer behaviour in the more 
land-abundant parts of the region, such as British Malaya. It was argued that 
the Malay reluctance to work for wages did not reflect an aversion to effort or 
a lack of desire for a cash income, but rather the fact that with relatively abun-
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dant supplies of land they could earn more in agriculture than as unskilled 
workers in the city. As Winstedt, a prominent British official in Malaya in the 
interwar years, pointed out, ‘because he is an independent farmer with no 
need to work for hire, the Malay has got an undeserved reputation for idle-
ness, which his Asiatic competitors take care to foster’ (Alatas 1977:50).
 Views of Malay idleness would not have been universally held, although 
there would certainly have been greater agreement on a further assertion 
of Van Gelderen’s (1961:147) that the indigenous cultivator was likely to be 
exploited in his or her dealings with the market economy because of the 
‘great difference in bargaining power between the buyer on the one hand and 
the seller on the other’. 
The buyer usually has both superior knowledge of the market situation 
and greater possibilities to reach and make use of more than one local 
market. This preponderance is even greater if the buyer is the only one, 
or one of a very small group of competitors, as against a larger number 
of persons offering the commodity for sale. In such a case it is very easy 
for a monopoly or semi-monopoly situation to develop, so that the local 
price of a commodity is forced downwards. Another factor producing the 
same effect is the vast difference in the value of the same unit of money for 
the two parties to the transaction […]. In many cases, in fact, the normal 
situation is one in which the necessity to sell is so urgent that what takes 
place is actually a forced sale. (Van Gelderen 1961:147)
The underlying implication was, of course, that the monopsonistic middle-
men were almost always Chinese, and it was their superior knowledge and 
bargaining power that led to the exploitation of the indigenous producer. 
Regardless of the truth or otherwise of these assertions it is indisputable 
that they were held by many Dutch colonial administrators, as well as by 
many indigenous Indonesians. Indeed, George Kahin (1952:64-74) argued 
that the rapid growth of the Sarekat Dagang Islam, formed by Raden Mas 
Tirtoadisoerjo in 1909 into a political-nationalist movement, was in large 
part due to ‘sharp Chinese trading practices’ on the part of ‘aggressively 
competitive Chinese entrepreneurs’ whose commercial power had increased 
as a result of the gradual lifting of travel restrictions between 1904 and 1911. 
The Sarekat Islam attracted ‘an avalanche of members’ (Kahin 1952:67) and 
galvanized anti-Chinese feelings to the point where, in 1912, there were anti-
Chinese riots in both Surakarta and Surabaya. 
 Outside Java, although the Chinese presence was larger relative to the 
indigenous population, some indigenous business groups did emerge in the 
last phase of the Dutch colonial era. Peter Post (1997:93-103) has described the 
rise of a group of Sumatran traders who were able to establish themselves in 
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Java, and built up quite extensive trading links with other parts of Asia, espe-
cially Japan. Several had close ties to leaders of the independence struggle, 
particularly Mohammad Hatta, and accompanied him on a trip to Japan in 
1933. The Japanese were keen to build up a network of indigenous traders in 
the Netherlands Indies for products such as textiles, especially as Japanese 
products were increasingly subject to boycotts by Chinese merchants. These 
links were strengthened during the Japanese occupation, and some of the 
Sumatran traders survived to play an important role in the early postinde-
pendence era. 
 Paradoxically in spite of the Dutch concern about the ability of the 
Javanese to participate in the ‘modern economy’, native Javanese accounted 
for a higher proportion of the nonagricultural labour than was the case in 
most other parts of the region (Table 2). Although it may have been true that 
many jobs in the nonagricultural labour force occupied by Javanese in the 
1930s were in unskilled labour, petty trade, and cottage industry, they also 
outnumbered both Chinese and Europeans in professional occupations and 
in the civil service. Even in trade, where the Chinese were certainly important, 
their numbers were only around 12 percent of indigenous workers in Java 
and 37 percent in the Outer Islands (the islands outside Java) (Table 3). By 
the 1930s it would appear that many indigenous Indonesians were availing 
themselves of a greater range of economic opportunities than were other 
Southeast Asians, or indeed the indigenous populations of Japanese-occupied 
Taiwan and Korea. Certainly it is arguable that many were forced into non-
agricultural occupations by the growing scarcity of agricultural land. But 
whether out of choice, or through desperation, indigenous Indonesians 
were moving into new occupations and accepting new challenges, both as 
em ployees and as self-employed business people. According to the 1930 
census, in Java alone almost 500,000 indigenous Indonesians were employed 
in professional occupations and in government service, while a further 
900,000 were in trading occupations (Department of Economic Affairs 
1936:Table 18).  
 In order to get a broader picture of the development of indigenous partici-
pation in the nonagricultural labour force, it is instructive to compare develop-
ments in the Netherlands Indies with those in the Philippines. Although the 
Chinese were not in fact a much smaller proportion of the total population in 
the Philippines than in Java (Table 4), the American administration did not 
seem to be nearly as anxious about their economic role as were the Dutch. 
Certainly the Americans were keen to build up a robust indigenous entre-
preneurial class in the Philippines, and viewed education as a key policy in 
achieving this goal. They facilitated the development of both secondary and 
tertiary education to a much greater extent than in any other Asian colony 
(Furnivall 1943:111). But other aspects of American policy were less conducive 
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to the development of indigenous entrepreneurs. Norman Owen (1972:52) 
pointed out that when the Americans arrived in 1898 there was very little 
large-scale Filipino manufacturing. The advent of a free-trade regime with 
the USA, together with an overvalued peso, made investment in Philippine 
industry unprofitable outside export processing. Because several of the key 
politicians who emerged in the run-up to self-government were connected to, 
and dependent on, the sugar sector, there were few advocates for rapid indus-
trialization. Much of the large-scale manufacturing industry that did emerge 
was controlled by foreign interests, either American, Chinese, or Spanish. 
This was also true of commercial banking. 
 The Chinese dominated internal trade in the Philippines, especially retail-
ing, and also participated in wholesaling and importing, as indeed was the 
Table 2. Indigenous labour force as a percentage of the total labour force, 
circa 1930
Indigenous workers as percentage of:
Total labour
force
Agricultural
workers
Non-agricultural
workers
Java (1930) 98.2 99.7 95.5
Outer Islands of
Indonesia (1930)
94.7 97.1 85.2
Straits Settlements (1931) 16.9 38.8 7.8
FMS (1931) 19.9 27.5 7.4
Burma (1931) 87.9 94.7 72.4
Philippines (1939) 98.6 99.7 97.9
Thailand (1937) 94.5 98.1 66.7
Korea (1930) 96.9 99.6 87.2
Taiwan (1930)a 92.3 99.5 80.1
a Refers to male labour force only.
Sources: Indonesia: Department of Economic Affairs 1936, VIII:Table 18; Thailand: 
Central Service of Statistics c.1946:75; Straits Settlements and FMS: Vlieland 
1932:Tables 121-141; Burma: Baxter 1941:25; Philippines: Commonwealth of the 
Philippines 1941:505-21; Korea: Chang 1966:Table 2; Taiwan: Barclay 1954:71. 
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case in many other parts of Southeast Asia. Foreign observers such as Kenneth 
Kurihara (1945:11) emphasized the lack of involvement of indigenous Filipinos 
in large-scale manufacturing, and argued that the ‘Philippine experience was 
no different from that in European dependencies or in independent countries 
which, economically, occupy a semicolonial status’. His analysis of the 1939 
census data on employment showed that most workers engaged in manu-
facturing were employed in traditional labour-intensive industries such as 
embroidery, dressmaking and tailoring, hatmaking, carpentry, native textiles, 
shoe and slipper manufacture, matmaking, and cigarette manufacture (1945:16-
7). Many women were employed as homeworkers on a putting-out basis. Few 
workers were learning new skills in factories using modern technologies, and 
even fewer were learning how to manage large-scale enterprises, whether in 
manufacturing or in other sectors of industry and commerce.
 While Kurihara’s criticisms were broadly correct, there is evidence that 
Filipinos were, by the late 1930s, controlling a higher proportion of nonagri-
cultural assets in the economy than was the case in other Asian colonies. Frank 
Golay (1969:Table 1) used the 1939 census data to estimate that Philippine 
Table 3. Indigenous and Chinese labour force by sector, Indonesia 1930
Sector Indigenous
labour force
by sector
Indigenous as
percentage of
the total
labour force
Chinese as
percentage of
indigenous
labour force
J. O.I. J. O.I. J. O.I.
Agriculture 65.3 81.6 99.7 97.1 0.2 2.7
Industry 11.5 7.7 97.4 88.2 2.3 12.4
Transport 1.4 1.4 93.2 89.0 2.5 9.1
Trade 6.3 3.1 87.9 70.1 11.6 36.6
Professions 0.7 0.7 89.1 87.4 3.6 7.9
Government 2.6 2.0 95.5 94.6 0.3 1.8
Other 12.1 3.5 98.9 89.0 0.7 11.5
Total 100.0 100.0 98.2 94.7 1.3 4.9
Note: Agriculture includes hunting, fi shing, forestry, mining, and salt manufacture. 
Government service includes police, army, and navy. J=Java, O.I. = Outer Islands.
Source: Department of Economic Affairs 1936,VIII:Table 18. 
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citizens owned 45 percent of all nonagricultural assets; in the manufactur-
ing industry the figure was higher (55 percent). Chinese nationals controlled 
around 14 percent of assets and Americans 25 percent. Of course, it is prob-
able that many Filipinos of mixed Chinese or Spanish descent were classified 
as indigenous Filipinos in the census data. But even allowing for this, Golay’s 
Table 4. Breakdown of colonial populations by ethnic background, 1930s
Colony Europeans/
Japanese/
Americans
Chinese Other Asians Indigenous
Taiwan (1935) 5.2 1.1a n.a 93.7
Korea (1939) 2.9 0.2 n.a 96.9
Indochina (1937) 0.2 1.4 n.a 98.4
Tonkin 0.2 0.4 n.a 99.4
Annam 0.1 0.2 n.a 99.7
Cochinchina 0.3 3.7 n.a 96.0
Cambodia 0.1 3.5 n.a 96.4
Laos 0.1 0.3 n.a 99.6
Thailand (1937) n.a 11.8 0.8 87.4
Burma (1931) 0.2 1.3 8.2b 90.3
Malaya (1931) 0.4 39.0 15.8 44.7
Philippines (1939) 0.3 0.7 n.a 99.0
Java (1930) 0.5 1.4 0.1 98.0
Other Indonesia 
(1930)
0.3 3.4 0.3 96.0
a Refers to citizens of mainland China, and other foreigners.
b Includes Indo-Burmans
Sources: Korea: Grajdanzev 1944:76; Taiwan: Barclay 1954:16; Indonesia: Boomgaard 
and Gooszen 1991; French Indochina: Robequain 1944:Tables 1 and 6; Thailand: 
Sompop 1989:32; Burma: Saito and Lee 1999:Table 1-3; Philippines: Bureau of Census 
and Statistics 1947:17; British Malaya: Department of Statistics 1939:36.
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figures do suggest that on the eve of the Pacific War Philippine citizens 
already exercised considerable control over the nonagricultural sectors of the 
economy. The consequences of this for postindependence development are 
explored below.
 Siam, although never a colony, also had to face the problem of consid-
erable foreign control over important sectors of the economy. Eliezer Ayal 
(1969:338) pointed out that the leaders of the 1932 coup ‘were imbued with 
Western ideas of exclusive nationalism and were therefore more sensitive to 
the presence and activities of unassimilated aliens in their country’. Their 
main motivation was to end the absolute monarchy and replace it with 
a constitutional government that would pursue more aggressively Thai 
national interests. The notion of ‘Thaification’ gained support, and, from 1935 
onwards, laws were passed to reserve certain urban occupations for Thai, and 
to give preference to firms owned by indigenous Thai in allocating govern-
ment contracts (Phongpaichit and Baker 1995:179; Yoshihara 1994:32). The 
Business Registration Act of 1936 was designed to facilitate the compilation 
of information on business ownership, and in 1938 a government-controlled 
Thai Rice Company was formed by the purchase of ten Chinese rice mills. 
The Liquid Fuel Act of 1939 attempted to establish government control over 
oil imports and distribution. Some of these policies were reversed later, but 
the measures of the 1930s set a precedent for ‘persistent, if erratic’ policies to 
indigenize the economy, which continued after 1945 (Ayal 1969:300-1, 338). 
Markets for land, labour and capital in the Netherlands Indies and British Malaya 
As has already been emphasized, it would be wrong to assume that the 
attitude of all colonial officials was one of purely paternalistic concern that 
the commercially incompetent indigenous population should be protected 
from the rapacity of the clever Chinese. By the beginning of the twentieth 
century it was becoming clear to at least some Dutch and French adminis-
trators, concerned about what was perceived as overpopulation in Java and 
Tonkin, that the living standards of the indigenous populations would only 
improve to the extent that they could participate more fully in the modern, 
nonagricultural economy. In Java, two facts were widely acknowledged by 
most scholars and administrators who had studied the empirical evidence: 
the proportion of agricultural output, including foodstuffs, which was sold 
on the market had increased to almost 50 percent in many parts of the island, 
and most rural households were diversifying their sources of income away 
from purely agricultural pursuits to manufacturing, transport, trade and 
wage labour (Van Laanen 1990:265; Boomgaard and Gooszen 1991:34-6). 
More broadly, D.H. Burger (1961:329), in discussing the ‘government’s native 
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economic policy’ in a thesis defended in 1939, quoted several officials includ-
ing J. van Gelderen, J.W. Meijer Ranneft, and J.H. Boeke to support his argu-
ment that the indigenous economy was becoming ever more monetized and 
commercialized, and as a result a native business class was slowly emerging.
 It was the slow speed of development of this business class that was the 
source of frustration to many Dutch observers, as well as to Indonesians 
themselves. Burger (1961:329) was no doubt correct when he argued that ‘if 
a vigorous group of native entrepreneurs had arisen, the authorities would 
almost certainly not have gone so far with their welfare policies as they have 
done’. Boeke (1961), in a lecture delivered in the late 1920s, in fact called for 
a different type of government policy that put less emphasis on improv-
ing the general level of welfare and more on encouraging the emergence of 
outstanding individuals with genuine entrepreneurial ability, a policy later 
characterized by Wim Wertheim (1964:264-5) as ‘betting on the strong’. Only 
the emergence of such individuals could, according to Boeke, pose an effec-
tive challenge to European and Chinese domination of the economy. But the 
1930s were hardly a propitious time for such a new breed of entrepreneurs to 
emerge and consolidate their position within the colonial economy.
 While the debate was continuing about the entrepreneurial capacities 
of indigenous populations, their involvement with market institutions was 
steadily increasing. By the dawn of the twentieth century, thousands of 
Javanese were moving to Sumatra and Borneo (Kalimantan) to work as wage 
labourers, and many thousands more were seeking opportunities as wage 
labourers at home. These numbers increased steadily until the onset of the 
depression of the 1930s. The increased willingness of the Javanese to move 
in search of better economic prospects obviously contradicted the stereotype 
of the indolent native who was unwilling to seek opportunities for economic 
self-improvement. And the involvement with market institutions was not 
limited to the labour market. Land also was becoming a marketed commod-
ity, both in Java and in other parts of the archipelago. In addition, the colonial 
authorities were experimenting with several credit programmes, includ-
ing a network of regional banks, village rice barns, and pawnshops, which 
attracted attention and admiration from both English and French colonial 
officials (Henry 1926; Angoulvant 1926:282-3; Furnivall 1934a, 1934b).
 Furnivall (1934a:26) was at pains to emphasize that even in the depths of 
the depression the entire credit system was solvent and required no state sub-
sidies. He argued strongly against the assertion that government-operated 
institutions simply displaced private suppliers of credit, especially credit 
provided by Chinese merchants and moneylenders. Certainly there appears 
to be little doubt that the government pawnshop service was operated 
more efficiently than the nineteenth-century Chinese pawnshops, and while 
the relaxation of the laws on Chinese residence might have led to greater 
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Chinese activity in rural areas in the twentieth century, it cannot be argued 
that taxpayers’ money was used to subsidize financial institutions that the 
private sector would have provided more efficiently. The private system did 
continue to expand alongside the state one, although, in the absence of data, 
it is impossible to tell how important privately supplied credit was compared 
with state provision. 
 Given that the people’s credit system did develop so rapidly in the inter-
war years, what was its impact on the indigenous economy in Java? Scholars 
seem very divided in their opinions. Alexander and Alexander (1991:386-7) 
argued that there was little evidence that the various rural credit institu-
tions served to stimulate economic diversification, and the main effect of the 
government-sponsored initiatives was to institutionalize the two-tier credit 
market in the rural economy. The relatively wealthy could get access to credit 
at lower rates of interest that they could then lend at higher rates to the rela-
tively poor, making large profits in the process. While no doubt correct, this 
argument ignores the basic economic point that credit markets always reflect 
a degree of dualism in the sense that some people will always be seen as more 
‘creditworthy’ than others. 
 If the government initiatives did greatly increase the supply of loanable 
funds to rural areas in Java, were these funds used for productive investment 
or for consumption purposes? Jennifer and Paul Alexander argued that most 
went on consumption, ceremonial expenditures, and for tiding people over 
emergencies such as ill health, unusually long dry seasons, and so on. Other 
authors argued that the credit available from both the pawnshops and the 
other credit institutions was at least partly used for productive purposes; 
Furnivall (1934b:11) pointed out that ‘a man may pawn his wife’s bangles 
and use the proceeds as the first instalment towards buying a motor bus on 
the hire purchase system’. Both Furnivall and Van Laanen (1990) suggested 
that the pawnshops were not the last resort of the desperate (as they tended 
to be in Europe), but rather a convenient source of credit to many people who 
were far from destitute, but who kept their savings in commodities rather 
than in cash or bank deposits. The fact that the real value of credit advanced 
through government institutions dropped so sharply after 1930 indicates that 
borrowings were related to investment opportunities rather than to financial 
pressures, and when the investment climate deteriorated as a result of the 
depression the demand for loans fell.
 In comparison with developments in the Netherlands Indies, the indigenous 
population of the Malayan peninsula was drawn more slowly into the cash 
economy in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Indeed Indonesian 
migrants began arriving in British Malaya in large numbers from the 1870s 
to take advantage of trading opportunities and of the growing demand for 
wage labour, which the indigenous Malays were reluctant to avail themselves 
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of (Roff 1967:37). According to W.R. Roff, the greater part of the Malaysian 
merchant community in Kuala Lumpur in the 1890s was said to originate 
from the Minangkabau region of West Sumatra, while Javanese began to 
arrive in considerable numbers in the Straits Settlements to work as labour-
ers. Most Malays preferred to stay in their traditional occupations as farmers 
and fishermen, and the British certainly did not encourage them to move out 
of these roles. By the end of the nineteenth century the seeds were sown that 
were to develop into ever more bitter ethnic hostilities between the migrant 
Asian populations and the indigenous Malays. Roff (1967:54) quotes articles 
that appeared in a Straits Chinese newspaper in 1894 and drew attention to 
Malay educational and economic backwardness and attributed it to ‘their 
slavish adherence to outmoded custom, the dissoluteness of their traditional 
leaders [...], their lack of industry and ambition, their hostility toward anyone 
who showed exceptional talents, and their inability to practice mutual self-
help’. Roff points out that however unfair these accusations were, ‘they came 
for many Malays uncomfortably near the truth’. 
 In the second decade of the twentieth century the British colonial authori-
ties became more obsessed with rice self-sufficiency, and more frustrated that 
production was not growing fast enough to keep up with rising domestic 
demand. The 1913 Malay Reservations Enactment gave Residents in the 
Federated Malay States the power to set aside land (mainly but not only rice 
land) for exclusive Malay ownership. The purpose of this legislation was 
to prevent alienation of Malay land to foreign (both Asian and European) 
planters, and to encourage the Malays to grow rice rather than crops that the 
British considered speculative, such as rubber. The land could not be mort-
gaged, leased, or sold to non-Malays. Although in passing this legislation the 
British claimed to have been influenced by the earlier land legislation in the 
Netherlands Indies, in fact the Malay enactment was more stringent in that 
it prevented even the leasing of land to non-Malay parties. In 1917, follow-
ing mounting anxiety about food shortages, more legislation was passed that 
empowered residents to regulate cropping patterns on Malay land, in effect 
preventing the cultivation of non-rice crops (Roff 1967:123; Lim 1977:121). 
 These draconian interventions in markets for both land and crops went 
well beyond Dutch measures in the Netherlands Indies, and indeed well 
beyond what the British did in other parts of Asia under their direct control. 
While one motivation was a genuine concern on the part of the colonial 
establishment that the growth of foreign estates could lead the Malay cultiva-
tor to become landless in his own country, it was clear that it was the official 
intention to keep the Malay away from the cultivation of crops other than 
rice. In particular, colonial officials showed themselves to be increasingly 
hostile to the idea that Malays should be involved in the cultivation of rubber 
(Lim 1977:116). After 1917, Malay smallholders were not permitted to obtain 
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non-Malay land for rubber cultivation and, indeed, land already alienated to 
Malays that was found to be used for growing rubber was withdrawn. 
 Colonial officials appeared impervious to the fact that growing rubber 
afforded a better return to land and labour than growing rice, even at the 
increased rice prices prevailing in 1918-1920. The Stevenson Scheme, imple-
mented in both Malaya and Ceylon in the 1920s to restrict the growth of 
rubber output and maintain its price, affected smallholder cultivation more 
severely than that of the estates (Jomo 1988:69). The main beneficiaries of this 
scheme were in fact smallholders in the Netherlands Indies, whose produc-
tion really took off at this time. Although the Dutch colonial establishment 
gave the Indonesian smallholder little positive encouragement, they were 
not discriminated against, and their ready access to land meant they could 
increase output with little official harassment.
 Paddy cultivation was to remain, in the words of one economic historian, 
‘the least profitable of all major occupations in Malaya’ right up till the 1950s 
(Lim 1977:176; Jomo 1988:Table 3.1). This did not prevent the British from con-
tinuing to deter the rural Malays from doing anything else. Their zeal to keep 
the Malays in traditional occupations affected educational policy. Winstedt, 
an influential British official, argued that the provision of English medium 
schools should be restricted lest it make rural Malays restless and eager 
to leave the kampong for the wider world (Lim 1977:176). Roff (1967:125) 
quotes a Director of Agriculture in 1934 who warned against the dangers of 
inducing the rural Malay to ‘forsake the life of their fathers for the glamour 
of new ways which put money in their pockets but today leave them empty 
tomorrow, and to abandon their rice-fields for new crops which they cannot 
themselves utilize and the market for which depends on outside world condi-
tions beyond their orbit’. Although enrolments in Malay vernacular schools 
increased rapidly, by the late 1930s only about 20 percent of eligible children 
were attending school. Many parents could not see the point of education that 
did not lead to social mobility (Snodgrass 1980:237-43; Rudner 1994:289-90). 
 It is probable that many Dutch administrators in the Netherlands Indies 
in the interwar years had similar feelings to those of British officials about 
the dangers of exposing indigenous cultivators to the full blast of national 
and world market forces. But Dutch colonial thinking had, by the 1920s, been 
forced to recognize reality. As we have seen the great majority of the popula-
tion in Java and in other parts of the archipelago were involved in the cash 
economy not just as producers of cash crops but also as suppliers of wage 
labour. Given the increasing density of population on restricted supplies of 
land they had little option but to avail themselves of whatever nonagricul-
tural opportunities for earning money were available. The purpose of the 
Ethical Policy and of the interventions adopted in the 1930s was not so much 
to protect the peasants from capitalism as to facilitate their gradual absorp-
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tion into the market economy. In Malaysia, by contrast, the aim of colonial 
policy appeared to be to build ever higher fences between the kampong 
Malay and the market economy. 
 According to the 1931 census, indigenous Malays comprised less than 
10  percent of the nonagricultural labour force in both the Straits Settlements 
and the Federated Malay States (FMS) (Table 2). This was a much lower per-
centage than in Java or the Outer Islands, or in Burma and Siam, although the 
Thai census data used a ‘nationality’ criterion that probably underestimated 
the actual number of ethnic Chinese in the labour force. It was also much 
lower than in Taiwan and Korea. Indigenous Malays were also a very low 
proportion of those engaged in trade and commerce compared with Burma 
and the Netherlands Indies, as well as Taiwan and Korea (Table 5). To some 
extent the very low ratio of indigenous Malays in the nonagricultural labour 
force reflected the fact that Malays were a much lower proportion of the total 
labour force in British Malaya than in other parts of East and Southeast Asia. 
Table 5. Indigenous workers as a percentage of the labour force in manu-
facturing, commerce, professions and government service
Indigenous workers as percentage of the labour force
Manufacturing Commerce/Trade Government and
professions
Indonesia (1930) 95.3 84.3 93.6
Straits Settlements 
(1931)
7.2 3.9 20.5
FMS (1931) 3.0 2.4 32.9
Burma (1931) 80.8 73.3 86.7
Philippines (1939) 97.6 82.7 96.5
Thailand (1937) 55.2 60.6 95.2
Korea (1930) 89.7 85.1 59.8
Taiwan (1930)a 78.5 86.9 49.2
a Male workers only
Sources: Sources: Indonesia: Department of Economic Affairs 1936, VIII:Table 18; 
Thailand: Central Service of Statistics c.1946:75; Straits Settlements and FMS: Vlieland 
1932:Tables 121-141; Burma: Baxter 1941:25; Philippines: Commonwealth of the 
Philippines 1941:505-14; Korea: Chang 1966:Table 2; Taiwan: Barclay 1954:71. 
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But there can be little doubt that the large influx of migrant workers into 
British Malaya, together with British policy aimed at keeping the indigenous 
population in rural areas, created a more extreme example of the plural 
economy than in other colonies in East and Southeast Asia. It was a legacy 
that postcolonial governments struggled with for the last four decades of the 
twentieth century. 
Indigenous entrepreneurship and economic opportunity in colonial Korea and Taiwan
The plural society and economy that attracted such attention throughout 
Southeast Asia in the last phase of European colonial rule took a very dif-
ferent form in the Japanese colonies. There was very little in-migration from 
China, or any other Asian country, except Japan, into either Taiwan or Korea, 
although the percentage of the population from the mainland in Taiwan was 
around one percent, which was higher than the percentage of Chinese nation-
als in the Philippines, and only slightly lower than the percentage in Burma 
and Java (Table 4). What did stand out in both Korea and Taiwan by the 1930s 
was the Japanese presence; Japanese citizens comprised over 5 percent of the 
total population in Taiwan and just under 3 percent in Korea (Table 4). 
 The vast majority of Japanese workers in both colonies was in nonagricul-
tural occupations; in Taiwan the largest number of employed males in 1930 
were in the professions and government, followed by commerce and manu-
facturing (Barclay 1954:Table 16). Many indigenous Taiwanese were in these 
occupations as well; in 1930 they comprised slightly less than half of all male 
workers employed in government and the professions. In Korea the propor-
tion was around 60 percent. These were higher proportions than in British 
Malaya, although much lower than in Burma and the Netherlands Indies, 
where indigenous races accounted for the great majority of employed workers 
in the professions and government service by 1930. In the Netherlands Indies, 
indigenous workers accounted for a higher proportion of the manufacturing 
labour force than in either Taiwan or Korea, and a roughly similar proportion 
of the labour force in trade and commerce (Table 5). 
 There is little evidence that the Japanese colonial regimes in either Taiwan 
or Korea were much concerned with the development of entrepreneurial 
capacity among the indigenous populations. In the context of Taiwan, Samuel 
Ho (1971:323) argued the following:
During the colonial period, the government relied primarily on its own 
savings and the savings of the Japanese corporate business structures it 
helped create to provide the capital for industry. It never encouraged the 
emergence of an indigenous industrialist class; in fact, its whole policy 
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was directed toward preventing the emergence of such a class. Until 
1924 Taiwanese were not allowed to organize or operate corporations 
unless there was Japanese participation. Thus the modern sector became 
a monopoly of the Japanese capitalists. Even after this restrictive rule 
against Taiwanese participation was rescinded, Taiwanese were reluctant 
to seek entry to the modern sector because of its domination by Japanese 
capitalists. Through its power to regulate, and license, and by granting 
exclusive privileges to Japanese capitalists, the government successfully 
kept the Taiwanese from acquiring any economic power. 
Ho’s argument was that Japanese policy in Taiwan was trapped in an image 
of its own creation. Taiwan was to be developed as an agricultural appendage 
of Japan, and it was only in the 1930s when the Japanese government became 
more preoccupied with war preparations that these views changed. In Korea, 
Daniel Juhn (1977:48) pointed out that in the 1930s, when the Japanese 
authorities were trying to attract the zaibatsu (large Japanese industrial con-
glomerates) to invest in Korean industry, some officials did argue for a strat-
egy that also encouraged Koreans to establish small and medium enterprises. 
But few policies were implemented, and Korean businesses received little 
assistance, compared with that granted to Japanese firms, which remained 
in a dominant position in virtually all sectors of industry and trade. Juhn 
(1973:128) argued that the activities of the industrial cooperatives that were 
established in Korea after 1910 were ‘insignificant and ineffective’ compared 
with small producers’ cooperatives in Japan. 
 A figure frequently quoted for Korea is that Japanese investors accounted 
for around 90 percent of all paid-up capital in industry by the late 1930s 
(Kim 1973:110-1; Haggard, Kang and Moon 1997:871; Chung 2006:123). These 
authors emphasize that Japanese investors dominated light as well as heavy 
manufacturing, and that most skilled workers, and almost all managers, 
were Japanese. The figure of 90 percent has been challenged by Carter Eckert 
(1991:54), who claimed that it ignored joint Japanese-Korean companies that 
‘may well have garnered the lion’s share of Korean capital’. He also argued 
that in any case such statistics did not capture the full extent of the transi-
tion, although often incomplete, by Korean merchants and landlords into the 
ranks of the industrial bourgeoisie (Eckert 1991:55). He cites the examples of 
the men who would go on to found the chaebol (the large industrial conglom-
erates established along the lines of the Japanese zaibatsu), which became 
famous in the post-1960 era, including Samsung, LG, and Hyundai. Most 
were sons of landlords who became small-scale businessmen in the 1930s and 
1940s in sectors such as brewing, rice milling, textiles, and vehicle repair. 
 It was certainly true that a few Koreans did rise to control substantial 
business empires during the Japanese era. The outstanding example of an 
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indigenous Korean industrial family that rose to wealth and power in the 
Japanese era were the Kim brothers who founded the Kyongsong Spinning 
Company. They came from a family that had accumulated substantial hold-
ings of rice land in the southern part of the country, and after education in 
Japan, the two sons moved into industry in the 1920s. The move was fraught 
with difficulties, not the least being the stiff competition from better-funded 
Japanese firms (McNamara 1990:174-5). But by the 1930s they had managed 
to consolidate their position in Korea and move into southern Manchuria, 
where they established a spinning plant in 1937. The textile venture survived 
the war and liberation, and prospered under the First Republic (McNamara 
1990:117; Juhn 1977:49-50). 
 The Kim success story was exceptional, although other large-scale Korean 
businesses were able to emerge and compete with Japanese firms in banking 
and in trade. Examples of successful entrepreneurs who are often cited 
include Pak Hung-sik who established a substantial wholesale and retail 
business, and the aristocratic Min clan who moved into banking during the 
Japanese era (Juhn 1973:126; McNamara 1990:Chapters 5 and 6). After the 
establishment of formal Japanese rule, there were few positions available to 
Koreans in the upper ranks of the civil service, or the military, so banking and 
finance became a socially acceptable occupation for those from families that 
had previously occupied senior bureaucratic posts. But as Dennis McNamara 
(1990:49) argued, all Korean business people ‘had to carefully align their 
investments to find a niche in the development plans of the colonial adminis-
tration’. Few were able to exploit such niches and build up substantial enter-
prises, and most businesses remained small-scale, as indeed was the case in 
other parts of colonial Asia.
 But however limited the development of an indigenous entrepreneur-
ial and managerial class in Korea before 1945, it is arguable that more was 
achieved than in most other colonies in Asia, outside India, and possibly 
the Philippines. One would search in vain for successful industrial ventures 
similar in size to the Kyongsong Textile Company, owned and managed by 
indigenous families in Siam, British Malaya, or the Netherlands Indies before 
1942. And as Eckert (1991:55) pointed out, some indigenous Koreans did own 
stock in both Korean and Japanese companies. This hardly ever happened 
in the Netherlands Indies, Siam, or British Malaya. Here the combination 
of foreign capital and local Chinese and Indian domination made it almost 
impossible for indigenous entrepreneurs to move beyond small-scale trading 
and manufacturing. Lack of access to credit was certainly one factor; in addi-
tion, very few indigenous Thais, Indonesians, or Malays received the sort of 
education, either at home or in the colonial motherland, that gave the Kim 
brothers the knowledge and confidence to establish new industrial ventures. 
The small number that did receive such education went into the civil service 
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or the military. This tradition was to continue after the advent of political 
independence. 
Eradicating the legacy of the plural economy: 1945-1965
The Japanese occupation from 1942 to 1945 facilitated the rise of an aggressive 
form of indigenism in several parts of Southeast Asia. This was due in part to 
the expropriation of almost all enterprises owned by European and American 
interests, and in part to the harsh treatment of many ethnic Chinese business 
people. In addition, the Japanese approach to economic policymaking was 
dirigiste in the extreme and relied on a range of economic controls embracing 
most aspects of production and distribution. Even if this controlled economy 
proved incapable of supplying basic needs to the great majority of the popu-
lation across Southeast Asia, it still presented nationalists across the region 
with an alternative model to the apparently more laissez-faire approach of the 
colonial powers (Golay et al. 1969:455-6). In spite of the increasing economic 
dislocation in the last phase of the Japanese period, some shrewd and deter-
mined indigenous business people were able to turn a chaotic situation to 
their own advantage and establish viable enterprises (Twang 1998:Chapter 3).
 On the political front, the fierce devotion to emperor, armed forces, and 
nation, which obviously inspired the Japanese military, made a deep impres-
sion on many young people in Southeast Asia, and this intense nationalism 
inevitably affected the way they viewed economic problems. After 1945, the 
relationship between indigenous business groups, the Chinese, and foreign 
businesses, especially those originating from the colonial power, could never 
be the same as it was before 1942. The forces of indigenism were stronger 
in some former colonies than in others. They were probably strongest in 
the Netherlands Indies, but even in the Philippines, where Chinese nation-
als were a very small proportion of the population in the late 1930s, some 
nationalist legislation was enacted in the decade after independence such 
as the Retail Trade Nationalization Law that prohibited those not holding 
Philippine nationality from owning retail trade outlets (Yoshihara 1994:28-
32). Nor were nationalist policies entirely absent in Siam, which was the only 
Southeast Asian country to have escaped direct colonial control. As Ayal 
(1969:338) argued, for much of the twentieth century successive Thai govern-
ments were concerned with foreign control over the economy, although it 
was only after the 1932 coup that ‘concrete measures for Thaification were 
introduced’. From 1935 onwards, laws were passed to reserve certain urban 
occupations for Thai and to give preference to indigenous Thai firms in allo-
cating government contracts (Phongpaichit and Baker 1995:179). The purpose 
of the legislation was to curtail the economic role of aliens, especially Chinese. 
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 An important implication of these measures was that the military leaders 
who dominated most governments in Siam (Thailand) from 1932 until the 
late 1950s were hostile to private enterprise and supportive of state capital-
ism. These attitudes were encouraged by the sojourns of several leading 
military figures in Italy, Germany, and Japan in the interwar years. But the 
Thai found, as most of the former colonies were also to find in the decades 
after 1945, that there were no shortcuts to greater indigenous control of the 
economy. The main problem was the acute shortage of managerial expertise 
among indigenous Thai; few had any idea at all of how to run large-scale 
productive enterprises, and many of the state corporations were financial 
failures. Many managers were former army officers and treated the enter-
prises they were supposed to be running as sources of personal enrichment 
and patronage. Ayal (1969:338-9) pointed out that even before 1940, the Thai 
experience confirmed the basic correlation between premature indigenism 
and corruption, a correlation that was to become more obvious in many other 
parts of the region after 1950. 
 In both Burma and Indonesia, indigenism in the postindependence years 
was the driving political force behind the adoption of inward-looking policies 
described by Myint (1967). In both former colonies, the independent govern-
ments wanted to eradicate what they saw as the pernicious legacy of the 
plural economy, with its apparent tight relationship between ethnicity and 
economic role. It has been suggested that the drive towards rapid indigen-
ism was essentially an elite phenomenon, ‘originating with and promoted by 
politicians seeking power for other ends and by members of a narrow indig-
enous entrepreneurial element who are motivated by avarice to expropriate 
alien wealth’ (Golay et al. 1969:447). While this was probably true in both 
Indonesia and Burma, it could hardly be denied that in both countries there 
was considerable grassroots antagonism against the role of the Chinese and 
the Indians respectively. In Burma this antagonism was in large part due to 
the Indian expropriation of indigenous cultivators. In Indonesia it resulted 
from the role of the Chinese in rural areas as traders and moneylenders, 
together with the widespread perception among nationalists that Chinese 
businesses had received preferential treatment under the Dutch. 
 In both Burma and Indonesia, the decade after independence witnessed 
much political rhetoric about socialism and popular control over the means of 
production. In Burma, there was a strong government push during the 1950s, 
even before the military regime assumed power, to take over both British and 
Indian firms and to establish new state enterprises in manufacturing. By 1960 
it was estimated that over 90 percent of industry was Burmese-owned. It was 
clear that many were poorly managed and that government industrial policy 
suffered from a lack of coordination. The Revolutionary Government which 
assumed control in the early 1960s, after a brief period of apparent openness 
Anne Booth - 9789004260443
Downloaded from Brill.com06/23/2020 09:19:22AM
via free access
The plural economy and its legacy in Asia 93
to both domestic and foreign private enterprise, abruptly reversed its policy 
and after 1963 prevented the establishment of any new private enterprise in 
manufacturing industry (Pfanner 1969:231-2). 
 In Indonesia, the struggle to break free of the legacy of the plural economy 
took a rather different form. The 1945 constitution enshrined the ‘family 
principle’ of economic organization and some nationalist leaders regarded 
cooperatives as an ‘excellent expression of Indonesian social ideals’ in spite 
of the fact that the peasant economy in Indonesia had, during the latter part 
of the colonial era, been increasingly based on private ownership of land and 
production for the market, whether domestic or foreign (Mackie 1971:44-5). 
Perhaps because the spirit of private enterprise was so strong in rural areas, 
little was achieved with agricultural cooperatives during the 1950s in spite 
of several government initiatives. There was little pressure for the establish-
ment of collective farms, even on the part of the Indonesian Communist 
Party (Mortimer 1974:288). Instead, in the early 1950s government policy was 
more directed to the fostering of indigenous entrepreneurs in the nonagricul-
tural economy. The so-called ‘Benteng’ programme, established immediately 
after independence, was at first directed mainly to getting more indigenous 
Indonesians involved in the lucrative import and export trade, which had 
been dominated in colonial times by the big Dutch trading houses and to a 
lesser extent by the Chinese. 
 Ralph Anspach (1969:168-79) discussed the failings of the programme in 
detail. As he pointed out, there was concern, even among some national-
ist politicians, at the blatant racial bias of the ‘Benteng’ measures, and the 
unwillingness to encourage Chinese businesses even when their owners had 
adopted Indonesian nationality. In addition, the lingering support for coop-
eratives, especially strong with Vice-President Mohammad Hatta, meant that 
some key politicians tended to oppose any plan to encourage private enter-
prise, whatever the ownership. The distaste of the Hatta camp for hothouse 
development of indigenous entrepreneurs was no doubt strengthened by the 
growing evidence that many of the so-called indigenous businesses that got 
access to import licences were simply fronts for more experienced Chinese 
companies. Chinese companies also in some cases filled the gap left by the 
Dutch companies that were either closed or nationalized in 1957-1958.
 It was the frustration of the failed indigenist policies of the 1950s which 
President Soekarno exploited after he brought the period of constitutional 
democracy to an end in 1958 and ushered in the Guided Economy. From 
then on, indigenist policies became intertwined with the aim of implement-
ing Indonesian socialism, although as Anspach (1969:126) pointed out, for 
most of the Indonesian political elite, socialism meant little more than ‘an 
emotional predilection, a vestigial sentiment from the revolutionary struggle 
against the capitalistic Dutch’. In fact, the decades of the 1950s and the 1960s 
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almost certainly witnessed an attenuation of the role of government in the 
Indonesian economy. Government expenditures relative to GDP were already 
low in Indonesia in comparison with several other former colonies in the late 
1950s (Table 6). After 1960, in spite of the increased rhetoric about Indonesian 
socialism, they fell further relative to GDP. In 1960, output from government 
enterprises including those expropriated from the Dutch amounted to only 
about 20 percent of total output (Booth 1998:Figure 4.1, Table 4.9). 
 In several respects, British Malaya in the late 1950s offered a stark contrast 
to the situation in both Burma and Indonesia, as well as that in Thailand. 
Given that the Chinese and, to a lesser extent, the Indian presence was so 
large, and that non-Malays were so dominant in the nonagricultural labour 
force, it might have been expected that indigenist policies would have been 
stronger there than in other parts of Southeast Asia. But according to Golay 
et al. (1969:454), the forces of indigenism were comparatively weak, and 
there was little or no socialist content to such indigenist policies as were 
implemented. Pressures on foreign, and especially British, enterprise were at 
best minor. Indeed, White (1996:269) has argued that by 1957 the British had 
achieved something approximating ‘neocolonialism’ or ‘informal empire’. 
The Alliance government maintained open economic policies, a competitive 
exchange rate, and a friendly attitude to foreign investment. In 1962, Malaya 
was the sixth largest recipient of direct foreign investment from Britain. 
Estate companies that had been established in the colonial era, far from being 
threatened by the government, were encouraged to undertake replanting and 
expansion of their activities. Although Malaya’s share of world rubber pro-
duction, both natural and synthetic, was only 18.2 percent in 1960 compared 
with 44.5 percent during the 1930s, the Alliance government recognized 
that both rubber and tin would continue to be important earners of foreign 
exchange over the 1960s, and that investment in both industries should be 
encouraged, whatever its provenance.
 At the same time the government of what was still British Malaya was 
urged by international development agencies to assume more responsibil-
ity for encouraging manufacturing industry. The report by the International 
Bank for Reconstruction and Development (as the World Bank was then 
known) published in 1955 recommended a two-pronged approach. On the 
one hand, the government should provide infrastructure including water, 
electric power, and roads while, on the other hand, it should ‘foster individ-
ual enterprise’ through measures such as provision of technical and market 
research for secondary industry, investment in appropriate education and 
training programmes, support for foreign investors in those sectors where 
their technical know-how could be crucial and also the judicious use of tariff 
protection. On this last point the report stressed that the tariff should be used 
as a means of encouraging development and not as a way of supporting 
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‘hopelessly high-cost industries’ (International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development 1955:123). 
 Tariff protection was an especially difficult issue because those parts of 
British Malaya that had developed as free ports, especially Singapore and 
Penang, were fearful that with independence their free-port status would be 
removed, and their consumers forced to pay high tariffs on imported goods, 
or buy high cost manufactures from other parts of Malaya. These fears were 
in part the reason for Singapore’s departure from the Federation of Malaysia 
in 1965. But the Malay political elites who dominated policymaking in the 
run-up to independence were themselves ambivalent about encouraging 
rapid industrialization because they knew that it would be the Chinese who 
would seize the opportunities provided by tariff protection. Some were 
also concerned about the impact of industrial protection on the urban-rural 
terms of trade, and about the welfare effects on small rural producers, the 
great majority of whom were Malay. As Frank Golay (1969:346) argued, the 
insecurity felt by the Malay leadership also caused them to accept, and even 
encourage, the continuing large Western stake in the economy. 
 The situation in the Philippines was different again. By the late 1930s, 
almost 45 percent of the assets of nonagricultural enterprises in the Philippines 
Table 6. Government expenditures and revenues as a percentage of GDP and 
investment and defence expenditures as a percentage of total expenditures, 
1957
As percentage of GDP
government:
As percentage of gov.
expenditures
Expenditures Revenues Investment Investment Defence
Taiwan 30 20 10 32 34
Burma 25 20 10 39 28
Korea (South) 22 11 9 40 30
Malaya 19 17 3 25 16
Thailand 16 12 5 29 22
Indonesia 15 12 2 11 15
Cambodia 14 12 n.a n.a 28
Philippines 12 11 3 22 14
Source: United Nations ECAFE 1961:Tables 22, 24, 25, 32, 33.
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were owned by Filipino citizens (Golay 1969:Table 1). This was a far higher 
proportion than in any other colonial territory in East or Southeast Asia. 
Certainly many of the large owners of both agricultural estates and nonagri-
cultural enterprises were of mixed Filipino and Chinese or Spanish descent, 
but the ethnicity issue was less politically fraught in the Philippines after 
1945 than in many other parts of the region. Many among the governing elite 
had some Chinese or Spanish ancestry. They harboured little overt hostility 
to American or other foreign enterprises, and had virtually no sympathy 
for socialist policies, or even for government taking an activist role in the 
economy. Land-reform policies made little progress in the period from the 
late 1940s to the late 1960s (Putzel 1992:Chapter 3). In the late 1950s, govern-
ment expenditure relative to GDP was the lowest in the region (Table 6). By 
and large the political forces that had come to power in the last phase of 
the American period remained in control after 1946, and became over time 
a barrier to further structural transformation of the economy. In this sense, 
American colonialism was as David Kang (2002:27) has argued, ‘pervasive 
and yet, ultimately, nontransformative’. 
 This is not to say that the Philippines did not experience substantial growth 
in the two decades or so after 1945. As Golay (1969:33) pointed out, after the 
implementation of high levels of protection through extensive import and 
foreign exchange controls after 1949, the manufacturing sector grew rapidly, 
and by 1960 manufacturing accounted for a higher proportion of GDP than in 
any other former colonial territory in Asia. Export growth slowed as a result 
of the overvaluation of the peso, and gradually the export sector was taken 
over by Philippine interests. It was these interests that ultimately pushed 
through the removal of exchange and import controls in 1962 and the sub-
stantial devaluation of the peso. It was much easier for the government of 
the day to undertake such measures once the export sector was seen to be 
in Philippine hands. At this point it might have appeared that pressures of 
indigenism were driving the Philippines in the direction of a more open and 
competitive economy. But in spite of these policy changes, it proved impos-
sible for the Philippines to move into the same kind of high-speed industrial 
growth as was achieved by Taiwan and South Korea after 1960. The benefits 
of the devaluation of 1962 were rapidly eroded by high inflation (Power and 
Sicat 1971:52), thus providing only a transitory boost to both existing and new 
export industries.
 In both Taiwan and South Korea, forces of indigenism were weaker than 
in much of Southeast Asia mainly because the dominant Japanese pres-
ence had left virtually no room for any other foreign participation in either 
economy. There was no equivalent of the large migrant Indian or Chinese 
presence, and neither was there any foreign investment apart from that of 
the Japanese. Thus, the abrupt departure of all citizens of the colonial power 
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in 1945-1946 left large holes in both economies, and policy debates revolved 
around what was going to fill them. In Taiwan, the administration that took 
over from the departing Japanese was imbued by the ‘statist economic ideas’ 
used in Guomindang circles to interpret Sun Yat-sen’s doctrine of fostering 
the people’s livelihood (Lai, Myers and Wei 1991:84). The administration led 
by Ch’en-I was in part concerned with building up a patronage network for 
migrants from the mainland, but was also imbued with an ideological bias 
in favour of a planned economy. Publicly owned firms soon controlled over 
70 percent of all industrial and agricultural enterprises; in addition, a new 
Monopoly Bureau controlled the supply and marketing of salt, camphor, 
opium, matches, liquor, and tobacco. The government also imposed strict 
regulations on private trade. 
 By the end of 1946, the Ch’en I administration probably controlled ‘even 
more economic activity than had the Japanese’ (Lai, Myers and Wei 1991:87). 
Even before the wave of refugees from the mainland in 1949, many main-
landers were employed in the bureaucracy, including the state enterprises. 
Steinhoff (1980:61) estimates that the numbers of mainlanders employed by 
state enterprises more than doubled between 1946 and 1949; in 1949 they 
accounted for more than one third of the total. Many lacked experience in 
the jobs they were allocated, and a process of rationalization of employ-
ment began in the early 1950s. Numbers of both mainlanders and Taiwanese 
working in the state enterprises fell. It is probable that some moved into 
private sector activities. In addition, the Taiwanese landlords received com-
pensation for the land they had surrendered in the form of government bonds 
and stock in former Japanese companies; some of them at least used these 
assets to build up new enterprises (Steinhoff 1980:59).
 In North Korea, the adoption of a strict socialist model led to the elimi-
nation of most forms of private enterprise by the end of the 1950s. In South 
Korea, most scholars have viewed the postarmistice years as characterized by 
rampant cronyism where Japanese properties, and aid dollars, largely from 
the USA, were distributed to business groups friendly to the Rhee regime 
at very low prices. It was thus possible for firms with the right connections 
to make ‘massive profits with no further effort than a bit of paper work in 
ordering imports’ (Jones and Sakong 1980:277). In addition, businesses with 
good political and bureaucratic connections received low interest loans, tax 
benefits, and other privileges. This was a situation not unlike that which the 
Benteng programme created in Indonesia, although in the Korean case large 
inflows of foreign aid greatly added to the opportunities for rent-seeking. 
Jones and Sakong (1980:41) have drawn a parallel between the charismatic 
political talents of Rhee and those of Soekarno, and argued that both were 
better suited to the creation and integration of a new nation than the develop-
ment of an existing one. 
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 Jones and Sakong (1980:276) pointed out that the situation changed with 
the advent of the Park government. Under Park, firms were expected to 
make a convincing argument that the privileges conferred on them would 
be used productively. Good connections with the bureaucracy were still 
important, but as the supply of potential entrepreneurs increased, an element 
of competition was introduced into the process of securing the necessary 
government-controlled inputs. In addition, the introduction of a more open 
and competitive market for foreign exchange, and a decline in aid flows, 
eliminated an important cause of rent-seeking behaviour. The policy reforms 
implemented by Park would serve as a model for other governments in the 
region in later years. 
 Many of the policy debates in the former colonial territories in the decade 
after 1945 revolved around issues of ownership of productive assets (foreign 
or local, state or private, indigenous or migrant Asian). But it was clear at least 
to the more thoughtful nationalists that, whatever their ultimate ownership, 
if assets were to be properly managed, it would be necessary to develop a 
class of professional managers and technically trained workers. Throughout 
the region, whether in the former Japanese colonies or in Southeast Asia, 
colonial educational legacies, especially at the tertiary level, were at best 
modest and at worst nonexistent. The main exception to the shortage of 
skilled workers was the Philippines where, in the mid 1950s, numbers of 
graduates in science and technology per 100,000 people were roughly the 
same as in Japan, and substantially higher than elsewhere in Asia (Table 
7). This, of course, was the result of the high secondary and tertiary enrol-
ments there in the late-colonial era. But in Taiwan and South Korea, gross 
enrolment ratios at the primary level (numbers of children enrolled as a 
percentage of total numbers in the seven to twelve age groups) had already 
caught up with the Philippines by the mid 1950s, and in South Korea gross 
enrolment ratios at the secondary level were higher (Table 7). The growth in 
educational enrolments in South Korea from the 1950s onwards meant that 
by the 1970s, almost half the male labour force had at least secondary educa-
tion (Booth 2003:153). 
 Even in those economies, such as South Korea and Taiwan, where, by the 
late 1960s and early 1970s the nonagricultural sectors of the economy were 
growing rapidly, it was not always easy to match the output of the educa-
tional system with the requirements of the labour market. A labour-force 
survey carried out in South Korea in 1974 found that although open unem-
ployment was only around 6.5 percent, a further 13 percent of workers were 
‘under-utilized’ in the sense that there was a mismatch between their quali-
fications and the work they were doing. In the Philippines, where growth 
was slower over the 1960s, a 1968 survey found that around 10 percent of 
employed workers were underutilized using the mismatch criterion. Many 
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were also working quite short hours (Hauser 1977:Table 5). While rapid 
expansion of access to education for the indigenous population was viewed 
by many postindependence politicians as one means of eradicating the legacy 
of the plural economy, finding productive jobs for the output of the education 
system proved more difficult than many had realized. These problems were 
to continue in many of the former Asian colonies to the present day. 
Conclusions
Furnivall argued that by the early twentieth century, European colonial-
ism had created societies in much of Southeast Asia where ethnicity and 
economic function were tightly linked and where the different races only 
came together in the marketplace and were never able to integrate in any 
other human activity. This chapter has argued that this rather stark view of 
Southeast Asian colonies should be modified in some respects. Although 
Table 7. Educational enrollments and science and technology graduates in 
Asia, circa 1955
 Gross enrolments ratios Science and 
technology
graduates per
100,000 people
Primary Secondary
Japan 64 94 34.9
Philippines 54 25 34.2
India 27 18 18.1
Korea (South) 54 36 17.2
Taiwan 54 24 14.3
China 36 8 4.8
Thailand 51 14 3.3
Vietnam (South) 21 4 0.6
British Malaya 49 18 n.a
Indonesia 39 8 n.a
Burma 24 9 n.a
Sources: United Nations Unesco 1963:103-5; United Nations ECAFE 1962:34.
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Furnivall put forward his views in the context of Burma and the Netherlands 
Indies, by the 1930s the racial division of labour was most pronounced in 
British Malaya, where migrant Chinese and Indians accounted for over 
half of the total population. It is not surprising that when British Malaya 
attained full independence in 1963 as the Federation of Malaysia, the island of 
Singapore, where the Chinese were in a large majority, did not remain long in 
a state where the federal government was dominated by ethnic Malays. After 
Singapore left the federation in 1965, Malays were in a majority, but after 
serious race riots in 1969 the Malaysian government felt compelled to embark 
on a ‘new economic policy’, which was in essence a government-led affirma-
tive action programme designed to get more Malays into the secondary and 
tertiary education system, and into nonagricultural employment. It is beyond 
the scope of this essay to evaluate the success of this policy; suffice to say that 
almost four decades after its inception, policies favouring ethnic Malays, and 
thus discriminating against Chinese and Indians, are still in place. Inevitably 
some Chinese and Indian professionals with skills in demand in other parts 
of the world have left the country.
 In Burma, the increasingly xenophobic military government led by 
General Ne Win drove many residents of Chinese and Indian descent back to 
their homelands or to third countries from the early 1960s onwards. After the 
reunification of Vietnam in 1975, many Vietnamese of Chinese descent also 
left the country, a considerable number as refugee ‘boat people’. In Indonesia, 
the nationalist and anti-Chinese policies of the Soekarno era were largely 
abandoned after 1966, but resentment against the role of the Chinese in the 
economy continued to simmer throughout the Suharto era. Many indigenous 
business people believed that large Chinese conglomerates, some of whose 
owners were known to be close to the Suharto family, received unfair advan-
tages from the government in the form of preferential access to government 
contracts and other privileges. Anti-Chinese feeling was one motivation in 
the popular protests that led to Suharto’s resignation in 1998.
 Probably the most peaceful and least discriminatory resolution of the 
problem of the plural society can be found in the Philippines and Thailand 
in the decades after 1960. In the Philippines, almost all Chinese migrants 
had taken Philippine citizenship by 1960. Their assimilation into broader 
Philippine society was helped by their adoption of Christianity; children of 
Chinese families were educated alongside Filipinos in government or church 
schools and shared both a language and cultural attitudes. In addition, some 
prominent politicians such as President Cory Aquino had some Chinese 
ancestry. In Thailand also, since the late 1950s, many politicians and senior 
government officials have been partly or largely of Chinese descent, and 
many Sino-Thai families have embraced Thai Buddhism. Although Sino-Thai 
business people continue to dominate most sectors of the nonagricultural 
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economy, this apparently causes less popular resentment than in either 
Malaysia or Indonesia. 
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